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WHY KELO IS NOT GOOD NEWS FOR LOCAL
PLANNERS AND DEVELOPERS
Daniel H. Cole*
INTRODUCTION

On June 23, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of
Kelo v. City of New London and all hell broke loose.' The political
controversy that erupted around Kelo took legal scholars by surprise.
After all, the decision did not significantly alter eminent domain
doctrine; the Court simply followed well-established precedents. But
Justice O'Connor's hyperbolic dissent inflamed property rights
advocates, media pundits, and state and federal legislators, who
assailed Kelo as the death knell for private property rights.2
Kelo's combination of relative legal insignificance and high
political salience makes it an interesting case study in crossinstitutional dynamics-how political, legal, and social forces
combine and recombine to determine the content of our laws. In this
case, we have a judicial decision that has generated a political
controversy and is leading to legislative changes in the law. Those
legislative changes will, in turn, affect future court decisions. Such
cross-institutional effects are not particularly unusual. They are a
distinguishing feature of landmark cases (think, for example, of
Brown v. Board of Education3 or Roe v. Wade4). But Kelo is not a
landmark case, Justice O'Connor's claims to the contrary
notwithstanding. It neither creates a new legal rule nor significantly
expands an old one. Relying entirely on precedent, it is a legally
* R. Bruce Townsend Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis. I am
grateful to my colleagues Florence Roisman and Robin Craig for their many helpful comments, to
Margaret Esler (2007 J.D. candidate) for her research assistance, and to Faith Long Knotts for her
general assistance. I remain exclusively responsible for any errors of commission or omission.
1. 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
2. See infra Part II.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also, e.g., DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY AND THE MEANING OF ROE v. WADE (1994); EVA R. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS, AND THE
COURTS: ROE V. WADE AND ITS AFTERMATH (1982).

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:803

conservative decision, which makes its political reception all the
more surprising and interesting.
The primary purpose of this Article is to explore the aftermath of
Kelo--particularly the strident media criticism of the Court and the
political response to that criticism-as a socio-legal phenomenon,
which is perhaps more important than the Supreme Court's ruling
itself. By addressing the political and legislative aftermath of Kelo,
we can understand why the Supreme Court's decision in the Kelo
case ultimately is not good news for local planners and developers.
Because of Kelo and its aftermath, local planners and developers are
likely to find it significantly more difficult to engage in urban
redevelopment throughout the United States.
This Article also has a secondary purpose, which is to place Kelo
and its political reception within a larger comparative institutional
context-a context I explore at length in another article, Political
Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private Property: A Comparative
InstitutionalAnalysis.5 American jurists traditionally have assumed,
often quite casually, that if the courts did not diligently protect
private property rights, political institutions would quickly and
thoroughly erode those rights. However, Kelo and its aftermath
support the proposition that political bodies, as well as courts, protect
private property rights. Indeed, those political bodies sometimes are
substantially more protective of property rights than the courts.
Part I of this Article reviews the Kelo case in the context of
previous Supreme Court rulings on eminent domain and public use.
Part II explores the political controversy Kelo spawned and its
legislative consequences, up to the end of January 2006. Based on
those consequences, Part III explains how Kelo and its aftermath
support positive political-economic theories concerning the political
protection of private property rights. The Article concludes with
predictions about Kelo's legacy for private property owners,
municipal planners, and developers.

5. Daniel H. Cole, Political Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private Property: A Comparative
InstitutionalAnalysis, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
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I. THE KELO CASE

A. Background: Urban "Blight," Redevelopment Plans, and Suzette
Kelo 's Home
The City of New London, the second smallest municipality in the
State of Connecticut, is situated on Long Island Sound at the mouth
of the Thames River. 6 Founded by John Winthrop and other settlers
from the Massachusetts Colony in 1646, New London was at one
time a center for the whaling industry. 7 When New Londoners
depleted the whale stocks, they turned to manufacturing. 8 Before the
Kelo case, the city's greatest claim to fame may have been that
Benedict Arnold's troops burned it down in 1781.9
Like many other old industrial cities in New England, New
London has struggled economically in recent decades. 10 According to
the 2000 census, median household income in New London was
$33,809, 20% below the national average." New London's
unemployment rate, at 7.6%, is nearly double the state-wide rate of
Connecticut. 12 As jobs have left New London, people have left with
them. By the Kelo litigation in 2004, the population of New London
had fallen to less than 24,000, the city's smallest population since
1920, from a high of 34,182 in 1960.13 When New London's
economic base declined, the city deteriorated physically, a problem
that is associated with "urban blight."'14 In 1990, the State of
Connecticut officially designated New London a "distressed

6. ePodunk,
New
London
Community
Profile,
http://www.epodunk.com/cgibin/genlnfo.php?loclndex--9221 (last visited Apr. 9,2006).
7. Id.; Brief of the Respondents at 1, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04108).
8. Brief of the Respondents, supra note 7, at 1.
9. ePodunk, supra note 6.
10. Brief of the Respondents, supra note 7, at 1.
11. ePodunk, supra note 6.
12. Brief of the Respondents, supra note 7, at 2.
13. Id.; Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
14. "Originally a term for a plant disease, the term 'blight' was first applied to neighborhoods during
the Progressive era, by urban planners who conceived of cities as similar to living organisms." Timothy
Sandefur, The "Back1ash" So Far: Will Citizens Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform? 11 (Pac.
Legal Found. Program for Judicial Awareness, Working Paper No. 05-015, 2005).
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municipality."' 5 Six years later, New London's economic distress
increased when the Navy closed its Naval Undersea Warfare Center
(NUWC) on the Fort Trumbull peninsula (Figure 1), putting another
1,500 people out of work. 16
It was in this historical and economic context that New London
undertook to redevelop the City's waterfront area near historic Fort
Trumbull. In 1998, Pfizer Pharmaceuticals announced plans to build
a $300 million research facility in the Fort Trumbull neighborhood. 7

Figure 1. The Fort Trumbull area of New London, Connecticut.
Source: New London Development Corporation,
http://nldc.org/business/fttrmbll.htm. Reprinted with permission.
Pfizer's announcement gave impetus to New London's efforts to
redevelop the adjacent area. In April 1998, the New London City
Council authorized the New London Redevelopment Corporation
(NLDC), a private, non-profit corporation (with no independent
15. Brief of the Respondents, supranote 7, at 1.
16 Id. at2
17. New
London
Development
Corporation,
Sites
Fort
Trumball,
http://nldc.org/business/fttrmbll.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2006) Pfizer's research facility opened in 2001.
Id
18 Id.
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power of eminent domain), to plan and oversee redevelopment of the
Fort Trumbull neighborhood. 19 Initially created in 1978, the NLDC
was reconstituted in 1997 specifically to assist the City of New
London in planning for redevelopment of the 32-acre site formerly
occupied by the NUWC.2 °
After six public meetings, held between April and November of
1998, and preparation of environmental impact and economic
evaluations in accordance with Connecticut state law 21 (both
completed in 1998), NLDC staff issued a draft Fort Trumbull
Municipal Development Plan ("the plan") in August 1999.22 The plan
included retail, commercial, and residential properties; a waterfront
hotel; conference center; marina; museum; and other public
23
amenities. NLDC expected the plan to create between 1,736 and
3,169 jobs and to generate as much as $1.25 million in tax revenues
for the city. 24 The NLDC Board formally adopted the plan on January
18, 2000.25 The New London City Council approved the plan the
same day and "authorized the NLDC to acquire the properties located
in the plan area, by eminent domain if necessary. 26 Funding for the
project came primarily from the State of Connecticut, which
contributed $78 million, although the City of New London
contributed $4 million, and the federal government devoted $2
million to the project.27
Before redevelopment could begin, the NLDC had to assemble into
a single parcel and purchase the entire 90-acre area of land. It
acquired 98% of the land by voluntary agreement with prior
owners. 2 8 However, nine owners of 15 properties, comprising a total
of only 1.54 acres of land, almost half of which were kept for
19. Brief of the Respondents, supra note 7, at 1, 4.
20. Id. at 3.
21. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 8-189, 22a-1 (West 2006).
22. Brief of the Respondents, supra note 7, at 4-6.
23. Id. at 6, 7.
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id. at 9.
26. Id. At this point, the NLDC became, in the words of Justice Stevens, "the city's development
agent." Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
27. New London Development Corporation, supranote 17.
28. Brief of the Respondents, supra note 7, at 9.
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investment or commercial purposes, refused to sell.29 Their holdout
30
did not prevent the first stages of redevelopment from proceeding.
By mid-2001, the NLDC had completed $12 million in infrastructure
work, including street and sidewalk improvements, new water, sewer
and utility lines, and extensive landscaping. 3 1 In addition, the city and
state made substantial improvements to the neighborhood's
wastewater treatment facility. 32 Meanwhile, the NLDC engaged in
months of unsuccessful negotiations with the nine property owners.33
Finally, in November 2000, the NLDC filed lawsuits to condemn the
properties by eminent domain and placed $1.6 million into escrow as
compensation. 34 The nine property owners, including the eponymous
Susette Kelo, sued to prevent the taking. 35 Ms. Kelo had owned her
home (Figure 2) since 1997.36 Another of the plaintiffs, Wilhelmina
Dery, had lived in her house in the Fort Trumbull neighborhood since
1918, her entire life.37 The city did not allege that the properties at
38
issue were "blighted or otherwise in poor condition.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 7.
See New London Development Corporation, supranote 17.
Id.
Id.
See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2659-60 (2005).
Brief of the Respondents, supra note 7, at 9.
Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2660.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Figure 2. Susette Kelo's home (in front of the Pfizer Pharmaceutical
campus). Reprinted with permission from Tim Martin and THE DAY
(New London, Conn.).
At trial, the plaintiffs argued that the public use requirement of the
U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment prohibited the City of New
London from using its eminent domain power to transfer property
from one private owner to another preferred private owner.3 9 After
losing at trial and on appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, 40 the
plaintiffs petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, which the
41
Court granted on September 28, 2004 .

39. Id
40 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A 2d 500 (Conn 2004) There were thiee dissenters from the
Connecticut Supreme Court's ruling Id at 500
41 Kelo v City of New London, 542 U S 965 (2004)
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B. The Supreme CourtDecision in Kelo
1. Justice Stevens 's Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Kelo on February 22,
2005 and decided the case on June 23, 2005. 42 In a 5-4 decision, the
Court ruled that the City of New London's exercise of eminent
domain qualified as a valid public use under the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution. 43 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens based the
Court's decision in Kelo almost entirely on previous Supreme Court
decisions such as Berman v. Parker,44 Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 45 and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,46 as well as many state
supreme court eminent domain decisions. 47 Together, those cases
clearly establish that "[p]romoting economic development is a
traditional and long accepted function of government."4 8 Berman, for
example, upheld a plan to redevelop a blighted part of Washington,
D.C., which involved taking by eminent domain an unblighted
department store.49 In Midkiff, the Court approved the taking of land
from a small group of oligopolists in order to create a functional,
modern land market. 50 In Monsanto, the Court upheld federal
pesticide legislation that permitted the taking of trade secrets upon
compensation in order to eliminate barriers to entry in pesticide
markets. 51 Other Supreme Court decisions endorsed takings designed
to promote mining and agriculture because of the perceived
importance of those industries to the welfare of the states involved in
those cases. 52 Thus, in the majority's view, it was well-settled law
42. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
43. Id. at 2657, 2658.
44. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
45. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
46. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
47. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655.
48. Id. at 2665.
49. See Berman, 348 U.S. 26.
50. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229.
51. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986.
52. See Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist.
v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161-62 (1896). Numerous state supreme court rulings similarly upheld the use
of eminent domain for economic development projects, such as railroads and canals. See, e.g., James
Ely, Can the "Despotic Power" Be Tamed? Reconsidering the Public Use Limitation on Eminent
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that the Public Use Clause did not require the land be "put into use
for the general public." 53 Of course, the government cannot simply
take land from one private individual and give it to another preferred
individual; there must be some reasonably substantial and specifiable
public purpose to or public benefit from the taking.54 But as long as
the political body exercising the power of eminent domain has
articulated a reasoned determination that the taking is for a public
purpose or is otherwise in the public interest, the Court will not
second-guess that determination, but content itself with ensuring that
just compensation is paid. 55 As Justice Stevens explained in Kelo,
"[flor more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording
legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify
56
the use of the takings power.",
In Kelo, according to the majority, the City of New London was
not simply favoring one private owner over another. "[T]here was no
evidence of an illegitimate purpose in this case. . . .[T]he City's
development plan was not adopted 'to benefit a particular class of
identifiable individuals.' 57 The plan might turn out to benefit some
private individuals over others, but that alone does not invalidate it
under the Public Use Clause, which does not require public
ownership and control. 58 The City of New London had made a
reasonable determination that redevelopment of the Fort Trumbull
neighborhood would substantially benefit the public, and taking
Susette Kelo's home and other properties in the neighborhood with
compensation was necessary to effectuate the city's comprehensive
Domain,
PROB.
&
PROP.,
Nov./Dec.
2003,
at
30,
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/rppt/publications/magazine/2003/nd/ely.html.
53. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244.
54. Id. at 245.
55. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005) ("Just as we decline to second-guess
the City's considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan, we also decline to secondguess the City's determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the project.");
see also E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part) (noting that the Takings Clause, in essence, "permit[s] the government to do what it
wants so long as it pays the charge"), cited in Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2667 n. 19.
56. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2664.
57. Id. at 2661-62.
58. Id.at 2666.
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development plans. 59 The Court would not substitute its judgment for
that of the elected representatives of New London.
Finally, it is worth noting that Justice Stevens, in his majority
opinion in Kelo, expressly recognized the important role that political
and legislative bodies play in limiting the exercise of eminent
domain:
We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State
from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings
power. Indeed, many States already impose "public use"
requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of
these requirements have been established as a matter of state
constitutional law, while others are expressed in state eminent
domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which
takings may be exercised. As the submissions of the parties and
their amici make clear, the necessity and wisdom of using
eminent domain to promote economic development are certainly
matters of legitimate public debate. This Court's authority,
however, extends only to determining whether the City's
proposed condemnations are for a "public use" within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the FederalConstitution.60
2. Justice O'Connor'sDissent
It would be an understatement to say that Justice O'Connor, joined
in dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas,
took a very different view of this case than did the majority. Whereas
the majority was certain that the case did not involve a simple
transfer of private property rights from one private owner to another,
Justice O'Connor began her dissent by characterizing the taking as

59. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy emphasized both the trial' court's inquiry into whether the
plan was intended to benefit private parties or the public, and the factual finding that the primary
motivation was public rather than private. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 2668 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Parts 1Iand III of this Article will elaborate on
Justice Stevens's important, and somewhat prescient, point about how the political process provides
additional protections for private property beyond those provided by the Fifth Amendment.
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accomplishing that precise end.6 ' Whereas the majority was certain
that its ruling ensured that substantial legal and political 62 protections
against unjustified takings remained, Justice O'Connor was equally
certain that the Court's ruling left all private property "vulnerable to
being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it
might be upgraded., 63 Whereas the majority was certain that its
decision broke no new legal ground but simply applied well-settled
rules of law to the facts of a new case, Justice O'Connor was equally
certain that the case presented "an issue of first impression," in which
the Court had chosen to "abandon[ ] [a] long-held, basic limitation on
government power."64 Whereas the majority was certain that the
Public Use Clause retained substantial import after its ruling, Justice
O'Connor was equally certain that the Court's ruling "effectively...
delete[d] the words 'for public use' from the Takings Clause of the
' 65
Fifth Amendment.
It was something of a surprise and a puzzle that Justice O'Connor
dissented from the Court's decision in Kelo. Twenty years earlier, she
had authored the majority decision in Midkiff, which upheld, in very
66
broad language, the State of Hawaii's land-redistribution program.
In Midkiff, she seemed to favor judicial restraint and deference to
legislative determinations of the public interest every bit as strongly
as Justice Stevens did in Kelo. She wrote that the Court's role in
67
eminent domain proceedings is "an extremely narrow' one.
Indeed, she noted that, "where the exercise of the eminent domain
power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court
has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public
Use Clause. 68 To the contrary, "the Court has made clear that it will
not substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what
61. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. See supranote 60 and accompanying text; see also infra Parts II, III.
63. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2677 ("Today nearly all real
property is susceptible to condemnation on the Court's theory.").
64. Id at 2671,2673.
65. Id. at 2671 (emphasis added).
66. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
67. Id. at 240.
68. Id. at 241 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Rindge Co. v. L.A. County, 262 U.S.
700 (1923); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921)).
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constitutes a public use
'unless the use be palpably without
69
foundation.'
reasonable
However, Justice O'Connor sought to distinguish her opinion in
Midkiff from Kelo based on a difference that went largely unnoticed
until she pointed it out in her Kelo dissent. In Midkiff, Justice
O'Connor and the Court expressly found that Hawaii's pre-existing
land oligopoly in effect constituted a public nuisance justifying
regulation: "Regulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a
classic exercise of a State's police powers." 70 By contrast, there was
no allegation in Kelo that the properties at issue violated the state's
police powers. Justice O'Connor's dissent argued that the lack of any
finding that "precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted
affirmative harm on society" made Kelo a very different case from all
previous Supreme Court eminent domain rulings. 71 Thus, Kelo was,
in the dissenters' view, a case of first impression-the first case in
which the Supreme Court had occasion to determine whether
economic development, without any finding that pre-existing uses
were socially harmful, constituted a valid public use justifying an
eminent domain taking. 72 By validating the City of New London's
taking in this case, the Court was "moving away from our decisions
sanctioning the condemnation of harmful property use," and
"significantly expand[ing] the meaning of public use.",73 In Justice
O'Connor's opinion, judicial deference should not extend so far as to
allow legislatures to transfer ownership from one group of private
owners to another simply by averring some conceivable public
benefit. Rather, the courts needed to "maintain[] a role . . . in
ferreting out takings whose sole purpose is to bestow a benefit on the
74
private transferee."

69. Id. (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
70. Id. at 242 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978); P.R. v. E. Sugar Assoc.,
156 F.2d 316 (ist Cir. 1946), cert. denied,329 U.S. 772 (1946); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921)).
71. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2674 (2005).
72. See id.at 2673.
73. Id. at 2675.
74. Id. Justice Thomas, in addition to signing onto Justice O'Connor's dissent, filed a dissent of his
own. Id. at 2677-87. He would have gone even further than Justice O'Connor in limiting the power of
eminent domain to cases where the government itself would own or control the property, even though
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To avoid such a consequence, Justice O'Connor and the other
dissenters would have made the eminent domain power not
coterminous or coextensive with the police power, as the Court had
ruled in previous cases, 75 but dependent on the existence of a police
power violation or public nuisance. The majority referred to this
proposed theory as "novel" 76 and declined to adopt it because,
contrary to Justice O'Connor's suggestion, it did not serve to
distinguish Kelo from previous Supreme Court rulings. Justice
Stevens noted:
There was nothing "harmful" about the nonblighted department
store at issue in Berman, . . . nothing "harmful" about the lands
at issue in the mining and agriculture cases [cited supra note 52],
. . . and certainly nothing "harmful" about the trade secrets
owned by the pesticide manufacturers in Monsanto. . . . In each
case, the public purpose we upheld depended on a private party's
future use of the concededly nonharmful property that was
taken.77
Justice O'Connor's dissent argued weakly that, in Berman, the
"blight resulting from extreme poverty" constituted the public
harm,78 but as Justice Stevens stated, the condemned department
store in Berman was no more socially harmful than Susette Kelo's
home. Moreover, Justice Stevens pointed to language in Berman that
justified condemnation of an entire neighborhood in order to ensure
orderly development. 79 Finally, if "blight resulting from extreme
doing so would have required express overruling of multiple Supreme Court precedents. No other
member of the Court was willing to go so far. Id.
75. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
76. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666 n.16.
77. Id. Justice Stevens stated the majority's focus on the property's future use was "faithful to the
text of the Takings Clause." Id.
78. Id. at 2674.
79. Id. at 2665 n.13. This point implicitly recognizes that the assembly of relatively large, contiguous
parcels of land for development or redevelopment often involves high transaction costs that can obstruct
voluntary market conveyances. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 61, 74-76 (1986) (discussing the problem of land assembly and its relation to eminent
domain).
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poverty" is sufficient public harm to justify condemnation under the
Public Use Clause, then it remains for Justice O'Connor to explain
precisely how New London's economic distress was legally
insufficient to justify eminent domain compared to the blight in
Washington, D.C. Her distinction between Kelo and Berman appears
to rest on an extremely slender reed. 0
In addition, Justice O'Connor grossly overstates Kelo's
significance by concluding that the Court's decision puts all private
property at risk from eminent domain takings. Given the majority's
extensive reliance on precedent-warranted by Kelo's factual
similarity to Berman and the broad language of Justice O'Connor's
own majority opinion in Midkiff-it seems unfair to blame Kelo alone
for the Public Use Clause's demise. Professor Thomas Merrill, who
81
has strongly criticized the Court's public use jurisprudence,
suggests that Kelo may actually mark the beginning of a retreat from
the extreme judicial deference shown in Midkiff 2 In that earlier case,
as well as in Berman, the Court adopted a minimum rationality testthe most deferential level of judicial review-for determining
83
whether eminent domain takings conform to the Public Use Clause.
The Kelo majority did not mention or invoke rationality review:

80. In this respect, Justice Thomas's willingness to simply overrule Berman, Midkiff, and dozens of
other precedents extending all the way back to the mid-19th century seems more principled, if less
practical. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Prior to Justice O'Connor's retirement, the Court
aligned 8-1 against Justice Thomas's literal, but not necessarily correct, reading of the Public Use
Clause. In his testimony before Congress on the Kelo case, Professor Thomas Merrill explained why a
literal reading of the Public Use Clause may not accord with the original intent of the drafters of the
Fifth Amendment. The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property.
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Prof. Thomas W.
Merrill,
Charles Keller Beekman
Prof. of Law, Columbia Univ.), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.cfm?id=1612&wit id=4661 [hereinafter Merrill Testimony].
But, as long as the Court is not prepared to overrule Berman and dozens of other cases, those cases
remain significant precedents upon which the majority in Kelo could legitimately rely, especially given
the strong similarity of the facts in Kelo and Berman. For reasons articulated by Justice Stevens, Justice
O'Connor's proposed public harm-based approach to eminent domain does not adequately distinguish
those two cases. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
81. See Merrill, supra note 79.
82. Merrill Testimony, supra note 80.
83. Id.
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[T]he decision suggests that courts should carefully review
condemnations that result in a private transfer of property, or are
not carried out in accordance with some planning exercise, in
order to determine whether the government is taking property
"under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual
purpose was to bestow a private benefit." Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion makes explicit that the Court's decision
upholding the condemnation in Kelo "does not foreclose the
possibility that a more stringent standard of review than that
announced in Berman and Midkiff might be appropriate for a
84
more narrowly drawn category of takings.,
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Kelo also referred to the trial
court's factual findings that the purpose of New London's use of
eminent domain was primarily public, rather than private.8 5 Both
Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens noted that even the three
dissenters from the Connecticut Supreme Court's ruling, who would
have preferred heightened review under a clear and convincing
86
evidence standard, agreed that the plan served a valid public use.
Justice O'Connor and the other Supreme Court dissenters did not
dispute these factual findings but insisted that they were legally
insignificant:
[T]here is nothing in the Court's rule or in Justice Kennedy's
gloss on that rule to prohibit property transfers generated with
less care, that are less comprehensive, that happen to result from
less elaborate process, whose only projected advantage is the
incidence of higher taxes, or that hope to transform an already
prosperous city into an even more prosperous one.87
This may be true, but as Professor Merrill has noted, "the facts are
set forth in the opinion for all to read, and provide a basis for
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. (quoting Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661, 2670).
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2670.
Id. at 2661, 2670.
Id. at 2676-77 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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distinguishing Kelo if in the future the Court decides (on some theory
not yet articulated) that creation of jobs or tax revenues without more
is insufficient to constitute a public use." 88 As in Justice Kennedy's
concurrence, Professor Merrill believes that Kelo satisfied the public
use requirement, even under a more rigorous judicial test designed to
prevent the potential abuses which concerned the dissenters.
On one point Justice O'Connor undeniably was correct: to the
extent that local governments exercise eminent domain for purposes
of redevelopment, wealth tends to be redistributed from poor to rich.
"The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with
disproportionate influence and power in the political process,
including large corporations and development firms. As for the
victims, the government now has license to transfer property from
those with fewer resources to those with more." 89 But any implication
that the government did not have such license to make transfers prior
to Kelo is simply false. 90 Moreover, as Professor Merrill noted in his
congressional testimony on Kelo, prohibiting eminent domain for
economic development purposes may not be preferable for poor and
minority communities because the effect would simply be to transfer
economic development, and any resulting jobs, away from the inner
city to "greenfields" on the outskirts of town. 91 It is difficult, indeed,
to see how Justice O'Connor's preferred nuisance-based test for
eminent domain takings would improve the situation of poor
communities. More likely, as Professor Merrill points out, such a rule
88. Merrill Testimony, supra note 80.
89. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2677. Justice Thomas made a similar point in his separate dissent. Id.at
2686-87. Were condemnees fully compensated, they would, by economic definition, be no worse off
following the taking. However, in practice, the owners of low-valued properties tend to be undercompensated. See, e.g., Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON.
473, 495 (1976); llya Somin, Robin Hood in Reverse: The Case Against Economic Development
Takings, POL. ANALYSIS, Feb. 22, 2005, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/ pas/pa535.pdf. But see
Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected PoliticalEconomy of Eminent Domain 18-21 (Notre Dame Law
Sch.
Legal
Studies,
Research
Paper
No.
06-01,
2006),
available
at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=875412 (arguing persuasively that even poor and
minority owners and tenants can successfully resist eminent domain takings if they are members of
tight-knit communities that can engage in collective action).
90. See generally Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). But the redistribution sometimes seems to go the other way, from
rich to poor. Haw. Hous.Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
91. Merrill Testimony, supra note 80.
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would serve mainly to reassure middle-class landowners, whose
properties are relatively safe from a strictly defined blight
92
designation.
Finally, whether or not one agrees with the substance of Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Kelo, or with her nuisance-based approach to
determining public use, there is no denying the political significance
of her dissent. Intentionally or not, Justice O'Connor's hyperbolic
mischaracterization of the Court's decision in Kelo-that it
"significantly expands the meaning of public use," so that no takings
are realistically excluded by the Public Use Clause,93 and "all private
property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another
private owner, so long as it might be upgraded" 94 -has been at least
partly responsible for setting off the fierce and, according to
Professor Merrill, 95 unprecedented political attacks on Kelo and the
Court.
II. KELO'S AFTERMATH:

FROM POLITICAL CONTROVERSY TO

LEGISLATION AND PRACTICAL ACTION

A. PoliticalControversy
Fueled by Justice O'Connor's combustive rhetoric, Kelo quickly
became a swear word among property rights advocates, the news
media, and even legislators who presumably stood to gain as a class
from the Court's continuing deference to political determinations of
eminent domain. Property rights groups, such as the Institute for
Justice (which litigated the Kelo case on behalf of Susette Kelo and
the other plaintiffs), the Heritage Foundation, the Claremont Institute,
and Defenders of Property Rights, lost no time in trumpeting Justice
O'Connor's declaration that Kelo placed all private property in the
92. Id.
93. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2675.
94. Id.at 2671.
95. Merrill Testimony, supra note 80 (stating that the Court's decision in Kelo "is unique in modem
annals of law in terms of the negative response it has evoked"). Other cases, like Roe v. Wade, may have
been more controversial and socially divisive, but Professor Merrill might be right that Kelo is unique in
the combined strength and uniformity of its negative reception.
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United States at risk of imminent government taking for economic
redevelopment; they labeled Kelo a travesty of justice.96 The case
also spawned new political coalitions, such as Minnesotans for
Eminent Domain Reform, 97 to fight government abuses of eminent
domain.
The attacks on Kelo came not just from the right, but from all
points on the political spectrum. 9 8 According to an article in the
National Review, U.S. Representative Maxine Waters of Los
Angeles-reputedly one of the most liberal members of Congressresponded to Kelo by asserting that "'[g]ovemment should be in the
96. See, e.g., C. Robert Ferguson, Kelo in California: The PropertyRights Counterrevolution,June
29, 2005, http://www.claremont.org/projects/local_gov/essays/kelo.html; Institute for Justice,
Grassroots Groundswell Grows Against Eminent Domain Abuse, July 12,
2005,
http://www.ij.org/private_property/connecticut7_12_05pr.html;
Ronald D. Utt, Property Rights
Protection
Get
Bogged
Down,
Dec.
1,
2005,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/SmartGrowth/wm927.cftn; Press Release, Defenders of Prop. Rights,
Supreme
Court
Chooses
Tax
Revenues
Over
Homeowners
(June
23,
2005),
http://www.yourpropertyrights.orglindex.asp?bid=141.
97. See Institute for Justice, Historic and Diverse Coalition Calls for Eminent Domain Reform in
Minnesota, Jan. 5, 2006, http://www.ij.org/private_property/castle/mnedr/1_5_06pr.html (describing the
post-Kelo creation of "fa]n historic coalition of civil rights groups, religious leaders, trade associations,
concerned citizens, and officials from Minnesota's major political parties" to support legislation
reforming that state's eminent domain laws).
98. Not all commentators on the right expressed outrage at the Court's ruling in Kelo. See, e.g., John
Hinderaker, Second Thoughts on Kelo: A Proper Understanding ofProperty Rights Suggests That the
Kelo Decision Wasn't So Bad After All, WEEKLY STANDARD, July 5, 2005, available at
http://www.weeklystandard.comlContent/Public/Articles/ooo/ooo/oo5/779fkbar.asp. The attacks from
more extreme opponents of Kelo were, perhaps, the most entertaining, if misguided. A Los Angeles
property rights activist, Logan Clements, also known as the "Hotel Souter Man," devised a plan to take
Supreme Court Justice David Souter's home in New Hampshire by eminent domain and turn it into a
hotel, as punishment for Justice Souter's vote with the majority in Kelo. See, e.g., Todd Morrison,
"Hotel Souter" Man Visits Weare; Clements Meets with Locals, Leaves Presentsfor Justice, UNION
LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Aug. 21, 2005, at A3; Benjamin Weyl, Activist Tries a Grabfor Jurist's
Property; A Foe of the High Court's Eminent Domain Ruling Wants to Apply It to Seize David H.
Souter's Home, L.A. TtMEs, June 30, 2005, at AIO. Unfortunately (or, perhaps, fortunately for Justice
Souter), Mr. Clements's effort reflects a complete misunderstanding of the Supreme Court's ruling in
Kelo. Any effort to take the land from one individual and give it to another, without any determination
that the land was blighted or distressed, and not pursuant to any general plan for development or
redevelopment, certainly would not constitute a public use under current Supreme Court precedent. See,
e.g., Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661 ("[l]t has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property
of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just
compensation."); id. at 2666-67 ("It is further argued that without a bright-line rule nothing would stop a
city from transferring citizen A's property to citizen B for the sole reason that citizen B will put the
property to a more productive use and thus pay more taxes. Such a one-to-one transfer of property,
executed outside the confines of an integrated development plan, is not presented in this case ....
[S]uch an unusual exercise of government power would certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose
was afoot.").
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business of protecting private property. . . . Private property is
precious in America."' 99 Representative Waters, along with fellow
liberal Democrat John Conyers, co-sponsored a bill with conservative
Republican James Sensenbrenner to deny federal funding to state and
local projects that would use eminent domain for economic
development.' 00 The backlash against Kelo has been multi-partisan.
Articles and editorials appeared in newspapers and magazines
around the country and abroad blasting the Court's ruling, often
adopting the dissent's rhetoric entirely, while ignoring the
precedential basis for the majority's decision. London's Economist,
for example, erroneously claimed that Kelo was not a traditional
eminent domain case but "something different," which "massively
expanded the government's power of eminent domain."''1 1 A
columnist in the St. Petersburg Times wrote that "'[t]he U.S.
Supreme Court has basically handed a big pile of crack cocaine to
every state and local government . . . and said, '[t]ry not to get
addicted.""0 02 The Virginian-Pilotreferred to the ruling in Kelo as a
"landmark" that "goes further than before in allowing the government
to invoke its eminent domain and to seize private property from
unwilling sellers."'10 3 A reporter for the Boston Globe wrote that Kelo
"eviscerat[ed] ...the Public Use clause. '104 In a similar vein, an
editor for The San Diego Union-Tribune wrote that "a bare majority
of the court recklessly rewrote two centuries of eminent domain
practice."' 1 5 In an opinion editorial for The Virginian-Pilot, U.S.

99. Rich Lowry, "Mad Max" Stands with the Right, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Aug. 5, 2005,
http://www.nationalreview.con/lowry/lowry200508050737.asp; see also Peter Hardin, Eminent-Domain
Outcry Spans Politics,RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Sept. 12, 2005, at Al; Sandefur, supra note 14, at
17.
100. See Mike Allen & Charles Babbington, House Votes to Undercut High Court on Property,
WASH. POST, July 1, 2005, at AO1; see also infra Part II.B.3.
101. See PropertyRights andEminent Domain: Hands Off Our Homes, ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 2005,
availableat http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story id=4298759.
102. Op-Ed, Homeowners Lose on Property Rights, USA TODAY, June 30, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-06-30-opinionline _x.htm?csp=N009.
103. So the City Says It Has a Planfor Your Property-A New Shopping Center to Benefit Everyone.
StartPacking., VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk), June 24, 2005, at Al.
104. Jeff Jacoby, Op-Ed, Eminent Injustice in New London, BOSTON GLOBE, June 26, 2005, at DI 1.
105. Robert J. Caldwell, Editorial, Property Wrongs: A Supreme Blunder, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
July 3, 2005, at G1.
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Representative Thelma Drake claimed that the Court "recklessly
expanded" the definition of "public use," and suggested that Kelo
authorized "arbitrary land grabs."' 10 6 Each of these authors either
failed to read the majority opinion in Kelo, failed to understand it, or
chose to ignore it.' 0 7 Many other media articles and editorials
similarly misconstrued the gist and legal significance of the Court's
ruling in Kelo. 10 8 Only a few media outlets seemed to get it right. 10 9
0
Fewer still endorsed the ruling."
It is unclear whether the media reaction to Kelo led or followed
public opposition to the Court's ruling. Opinion polls verify,
however, that Kelo is a deeply unpopular ruling. According to a
Mason-Dixon Polling and Research poll of Florida residents, 74% of
democrats, 75% of republicans, and 72% of independents disagreed
with the Supreme Court's ruling, and 89% of voters favored
legislation to provide greater protection to private property owners
against eminent domain takings.'
A similar poll of Connecticut
106. Thelma Drake, Op-Ed, Property Rights Should Supercede Arbitrary Land Grabs, VIRGINIANPILOT (Norfolk), July 1, 2005, at B 11.
107. This is not to argue that criticism of Kelo is unwarranted, but that many of Kelo's critics have,
intentionally or otherwise, mischaracterized the ruling.
108. See, e.g., Mike Cline, Editorial, Ruling Drasticallyand Unfortunately Changes the Idea of Our
Private PropertyRights, CHRON.-TRIB. (Marion, Ind.), June 26, 2005, at 10A; Jimmie Collins, Court
Extends Eminent Domain to Local Level: Local Leaders Can Close Homes, Business for Development,
DAILY TExAN, June 24, 2005; Michael Doyle, Cities Get More Power to Seize Homes; Supreme Court
Broadens Use of Eminent Domain, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), June 24, 2005, at IA; Editorial,
PropertyRights No Longer Secure, ENTERPRISE REC. (Chico, Cal.), June 27, 2005; Richard Khavkine,
Property Rights Fade. Supreme Court Expands Use of Eminent Domain, HOME NEWS TRIB. (E.
Brunswick, N.J.), June 24, 2005, at Al; Chris Richard & Dan Lee, JusticesDilute Land Rights; Ruling:
The Court Says Private Property Can Be Seized and Converted to More ProfitablePrivate Use, PRESS
ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), June 24, 2005, at A01; Mike Salinero, Court Expands Power to Seize
Land, TAMPA TRtB., June 24, 2005, at 1;Robert Trigaux, Your Home Could Be Up for Grabs, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, June 24, 2005, at ID.
109. See, e.g., Editorial, Eminent Latitude, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at A30 (criticizing the ruling
as unjust but recognizing that it was legally correct); Op-Ed, Ruling Leaves Door Open to Abuse, USA
TODAY, June 24, 2005, at 14A (criticizing the ruling but understanding that the majority's decision was
"rooted in high-court precedents over the past 50 years").
110. See, e.g., David Barron, Property Ruling Has Many Precedents,TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.),
June 30, 2005, at A9; John R. Nolon & Jessica A. Bacher, EnvironmentalLaw; 'Takings' and the Court;
Despite Alarmists, 'Kelo' Decision Protects Property Owners and Serves the General Good, N.Y. L.J.,
June 29, 2005, at 5; Scot Wrighton, Editorial, Eminent Domain: Private Property Rights Still Safe,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 30, 2005, at A13.
11l.See Florida Voters Favor Eminent Domain Restrictions, Bus. J. OF JACKSONVILLE, Nov. 8,
2005, available at httpi:/jacksonville.bizjournals.conjacksonville/stories/2005/11/07/dailyl2.htm.
However, this report of survey results does not provide raw data or indicate margins of error.
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residents found that eight in ten followed the Kelo case closely and
disagreed with the Supreme Court's ruling. 1 2 That same poll found
that a majority of Connecticut residents (61%) do not believe
governments should use eminent domain for historically noncontroversial uses such as taking property to build roads or
schools."l 3 A New Jersey survey asked not whether citizens agreed or
disagreed with the Court's decision in Kelo, but whether they thought
governments in their state overused eminent domain. 114 A plurality of
37% thought governments used eminent domain too much; 24%
thought governments used it about enough; 11% thought
governments under-used eminent domain; and 28% said they did not
know. 1 5 A Zogby poll conducted for the National Farm Bureau
found that Americans believe, by two to one, that governments
should not use eminent domain except for roads or utilities; 83%
believe that governments should not use eminent domain to promote
private economic development. 116 Another national poll, conducted
by NBC News and the Wall Street Journal,found that property rights
protection has become the most important domestic legal issue for
Americans, ahead of other issues such as parental notification of
7
abortions for minors, the right to die, and medical marijuana use."
However, the NBC/Wall Street Journal poll did not ask for
respondents' opinions on the Kelo decision or whether someone

112. See Connecticut Voters Say 11-I Stop Eminent Domain, Quinnipiac Poll Finds; Saving Groton
Sub Base is High Priority, QU DAILY (Quinnipiac Univ., Hamden, Conn.), July 28, 2005,
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/xl 1385.xml?ReleaseLD=821. The poll of 1,067 registered Connecticut voters
was conducted from July 19-25, 2005 and has a margin of error of +/- 3%. Id.
113. Id.
114. MONMOUTH UNIV./GANNETT N.J. POLL, THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN: ACCEPTABLE USES

ARE FEW SAY GARDEN STATE RESIDENTS 5 (2005), available at http://www.monmouth.edu/polling
(follow "Poll Reports" hyperlink; then "The Power of Eminent Domain" hyperlink). This was a poll of
800 adult New Jersey residents, conducted from September 21-26, 2005, with an error rate (at 95%
confidence level) of +/- 3.5%. Id. at 8.
115. Id. at 5.
116. See American Farm Bureau, FB Survey: Americans Oppose Eminent Domain, Jan. 9, 2006,
http://www.fb.org/news/nr/nr2006/nr0l09a.html. This poll was a telephone survey of 1,076 adults
conducted between October 29 and November 2, 2005, with a margin of error of +/- 3%. Id.
117. See PETER HART & WILLIAM D. MCINTURFF, NBC NEWS/WALL STREET JOURNAL SURVEY 15
(2005), http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/WSJ-NBC-Poll-7_15_05.pdf. Surveyors conducted telephone
interviews with 1,009 adults from July 8-11, 2005. The poll has a margin of error of +/- 3.1%. Id. at I.
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should curtail eminent domain use.' 1 8 At least one, non-scientific
national poll by CNN found that a majority of Americans believe that
9
the power of eminent domain should be abolished entirely. "1
However much weight one assigns to these various public opinion
polls, Kelo is plainly unpopular. One is hard-pressed to find much
support for the Supreme Court's ruling anywhere, except among local
government groups, such as the National League of Cities, 120 city
planners, and developers. Opponents of eminent domain have
overwhelmed those supporters. The agitation of property rights
activists, media criticism, and poor public opinion of Kelo have led to
a political backlash, as federal, state, and even
local legislative bodies
21
domain.'
eminent
limit
have taken steps to
B. Constitutional,Judicial,and Legislative Efforts to Limit Eminent
Domain
Since the Supreme Court decided Kelo, Congress, 38 state
legislatures, and even a few local governments have considered
legislation to restrict eminent domain. 122 Even before Kelo, however,
several states limited the power of eminent domain by constitutional
23
amendment, judicial decision, or legislation. 1

118. See id.
119. See, e.g., CNN.com QuickVote, Local Governments Should Be Able to Seize Homes and
Businesses, June 23, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/POLLSERVER/results/! 8442.exclude.html.
120. See Press Release, Nat'l League of Cities, Supreme Court Decision in Eminent Domain Case
Supported by Cities (June 23, 2005), available at http://www.nlc.org/Newsroom/pressroom/5506.cfrn.
121. Kelo has spawned a cottage industry among property law scholars. This article is one of probably
dozens that scholars have or will publish about the case in this year alone.
122. See Sandefur, supranote 14, at 17.
123. Under the U.S. federal system, the rights embodied in the federal Constitution constitute a floor.
Congress may enact ordinary legislation that provides greater, but not less, protection than the
Constitution affords. Likewise, the states, through their own constitutions or statutes, may provide
greater, but not less, protection for civil rights, including property rights, than the federal Constitution
guarantees. See, e.g., David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism,91 MICH. L. REV.
274, 279 (1992) ("States remain free . . . to add to the national values given voice in the U.S.
Constitution, which constitute a core, an irreducible minimum.").

20061

WHY KELO IS NOT GOOD NEWS FOR LOCAL PLANNERS

825

1. State Limitations on Eminent Domain Before Kelo
Many existing state constitutions, as interpreted by state supreme
courts, would not have permitted the City of New London to take
Susette Kelo's land. Below are several examples of state court cases
interpreting state constitutions to impose substantial limits on
eminent domain.
9

In South Carolina, the state supreme court ruled in 1978 that the
state constitution prohibits condemnation for purposes of
economic development. 124 In Karesh v. City Council, the court
ruled that a city could not use eminent domain to lease land to a
private corporation for parking and convention space because the
project primarily benefited the private owner, with no assurance
that the public would enjoy use of the facilities. 125 The court held
that "[m]ere benefit to the public or permission by the owner for
use of the property
by the public are not enough to constitute a
126
public use."'

*

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Arkansas's constitution and legislative grants of eminent domain
authority to cities do not permit condemnations for economic
development. In the 1967 case of City of Little Rock v. Raines, the
Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the city's power of eminent
domain did not extend to taking agricultural lands for the purpose
of creating an industrial development, even if that development
was "related" to a port facility. 127 The Arkansas legislature
strictly limited its grant of eminent domain power to
municipalities to the purposes of ports, harbors, river-rail and
barge terminals, and related structures; industrial sites or parks
1 28
were "not even remotely suggested" as acceptable public uses.
The court concluded by noting that "[i]f the people of Arkansas
desire to confer the power on municipalities to acquire private
property by eminent domain for industrial development, they

Karesh v. City Council, 247 S.E.2d 342 (S.C. 1978).
Id.
Id. at 345 (citing Tuomey Hosp. v. City of Sumter, 134 S.E.2d 744, 747 (S.C. 1964)).
City of Little Rock v. Raines, 411 S.W.2d 486 (Ark. 1967).
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2719, 19-2702 (1956); Raines, 411 S.W.2d at 492.
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should do so in clear and unmistakeable
language in view of the
' 29
constitution."'
our
of
provisions
*

In 1957, the Maine Supreme Court ruled that the state's
constitution does not permit a grant or use of eminent domain
for
1 30
purposes of industrial development to raise tax revenues.

*

Raising tax revenues is not a sufficient public use to validate
eminent domain under the State of Washington's constitution.
Article I, section 16 of that constitution provides that "[p]rivate
property shall not be taken for private use, except for private
ways of necessity, and for drains, flumes, or ditches on or across
the lands of others for agricultural, domestic, or sanitary
purposes."' 13 1 In 1981, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled
that a proposed city plan to use eminent domain to acquire land to
rebuild the downtown area into a public space, shopping center,
art museum, and parking lot violated the state's constitution
because only a portion of the project would be put to a truly
public use. 132 The court noted that "[i]f a private use is combined
with a public use in such a way that the two cannot be separated,
the right of eminent domain cannot be invoked.' 33 The court did
not, however, completely 134
rule out the use of eminent domain for
projects.
"urban renewal"

*

Kentucky's constitution is more restrictive than most regarding
the power of eminent domain. Indeed, according to a state
attorney general's opinion, the constitution does not even permit
oil and gas companies, which in most states have the power of
eminent domain, to condemn private lands for running
pipelines. 135 In the 1979 case of City of Owensboro v.
McCormick, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the city's

129. Raines, 411 S.W.2d at 494-95.
130. Opinion of the Justices, 131 A.2d 904, 906-08 (Me. 1957).
131. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
132. In re Seattle, 638 P.2d 549 (Wash. 1981) (en banc).
133. Id. at 556 (citing State ex rel. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Superior Court, 233 P. 651
(Wash. 1925)).
134. Id. at 555 (citing Miller v. Tacoma, 378 P.2d 464 (Wash. 1963)).
135. Op. Att'y Gen. (Ky. 1979), 1979 Ky. AG LEXIS 269 (Ky. 1979).
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taking of agricultural property for the purpose of private
commercial development violated the Public Use Clause of the
state constitution. 136 The court wrote that "[n]aked and
unconditional governmental power to compel a citizen to
surrender his productive and attractive property to another citizen
who will use it predominantly for his own private profit just
because such alternative private use is thought to be preferable in
the subjective notion of governmental authorities is repugnant to
37
our constitutional protections ....
*

New Hampshire's Eminent Domain Procedure Act seems to
provide an expansive power of eminent domain, not restricted to
public uses, but allowing condemnation for "public purposes, and
net-public benefit."' 138 Nevertheless, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court, in the 1985 case of Merrill v. City of Manchester,
invalidated a condemnation for an industrial park development
because139it found such a use would only incidentally benefit the
public.

•

The Illinois Supreme Court, in 2002, refused to allow the
Southwestern Illinois Development Authority-a municipal
corporation created by the Illinois General Assembly to promote
economic development-to transfer private property to an
adjacent, privately-owned motorsport racetrack. 140 The court held
that any public benefit from the condemnation was purew
incidental; the primary beneficiary plainly was the racetrack.'
But the court distinguished this case from others involving "slums
and blighted areas," where it would allow eminent domain42even if
the subsequent use of the property was primarily private. 1

0

136. City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1979).
137. Id. at5.
138. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 498-A:1 (2005).
139. Merrill v. City of Manchester, 499 A.2d 216 (N.H. 1985). By contrast, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court has upheld condemnations for sewage treatment plants, cemeteries, and library parking
lots. See Molloy v. Town of Exeter, 218 A.2d 52 (N.H. 1966); Browne v. Park Cemetery, 101 A. 34
(N.H. 1917); Lyford v. City of Laconia, 72 A. 1085 (N.H. 1909).
140. Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002).

141. Id. at 19-20.
142. Id. at 9.
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In 2004, Michigan's Supreme Court ruled in County of Wayne v.
Hathcock that economic development does not, generally
speaking, constitute a valid public use under the state's
constitution. 143 Economic development may constitute a valid
public use in Michigan, but only where it possesses one of three
characteristics: (1) "'public necessity of the extreme sort,"' for
example, where the very existence of some publicly valuable
enterprise, such as "highways, railroads, canals, and other
instrumentalities of commerce," depends on the condemnation;
(2) the private entity that benefits from the taking "remains
accountable to the public in its use of the property," for example,
cases involving regulated utilities; or (3) the land subject to
condemnation is of "public concern" because of its use or
condition, for example, slums and blighted areas that are
condemned not in view of some future use to which they might be
put, but because of their presently poor condition. 144 In Hathcock,
the court found that the proposed economic development project
met none of these conditions and ruled that the project violated
the public use requirement for eminent domain, even though the
court found substantial evidence that the public would in fact
benefit from the project. 145 In reaching this decision, the court
took occasion to expressly overrule its own infamous Poletown
decision of 1981, which authorized the City of Detroit to
condemn an entire lower-middle class neighborhood, including
hundreds of homes, businesses, churches, hospitals, and schools,
could build a new Cadillac plant and
so that General Motors
46
adjacent parking lots. 1
The various state limitations on eminent domain discussed above
differ in scope and effect. In some states, such as Arkansas and
Michigan, it seems likely the states would have decided the Kelo case
in favor of the plaintiffs. In the Washington, New London might have
argued successfully that the Fort Trumbull Municipal Development
143. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
144. Id. at 781-83.
145. Id. at 778, 781.
146. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
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Plan fell within the urban renewal exception as interpreted in In re
Seattle.14 7 In any case, these various state court rulings on eminent
domain serve as reminders that even before Kelo the Supreme Court
and the federal Constitution were not the only, and not necessarily the
most important, sources of property rights protection in the United
States.
Nevertheless, there is reason to wonder about the sufficiency of
existing protections against the perceived abuse of eminent domain.
Precious little empirical information exists about the use or abuse of
eminent domain throughout the United States, but in 2003, Dana
Berliner of the advocacy group Institute for Justice published a "fiveyear, state-by-state report examining the abuse of eminent
domain."' 148 That study reported a total of more than 10,000 cases
filed or threatened eminent domain takings between 1998 and 2002,
including in states that appear to limit or prohibit such takings for
economic development. 149 As Professor Vicky Been pointed out in a
presentation at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools,' 50 it is difficult to tell whether that number is
too high, too low, or just right. Samuel R. Staley and John P. Blair
have pointed out the following:
States vary significantly in their willingness to use eminent
domain.... North Carolina cities, for example, have the power
to use eminent domain but generally refrain from using it. On the
other extreme, Florida has threatened 2,055 properties with
condemnation for eight redevelopment projects.
These variations are important. While highly urbanized states
such as Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New Jersey appear to
use eminent domain extensively, other states with many large
urban areas such as New York, North Carolina, and Texas are
147. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
148. DANA

BERLINER,

PUBLIC

POWER,

PRIVATE

GAIN

(2003),

available

http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdfreport/ED-report.pdf.
149. Id.at2.
150. Iam grateful to Professor Been for providing me with the notes for her presentation.

at
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much less active. Even California, while one of the most active
users of eminent domain, invokes the process less often than
Florida and Pennsylvania.15 '
Moreover, we still do not know how governments are using
eminent domain, 152 the costs and benefits of using eminent domain
for economic development, and the likely effects of various reform
proposals. Nevertheless, the sheer number of estimated eminent
domain takings and threats of takings creates a perception of abuse,
which Kelo magnified. However much we do or do not know about
the use or abuse of eminent domain and the costs or benefits of
limiting governmental authority to take land for economic
development, the fact remains that the perceived crisis of eminent
domain has led to a political and legislative backlash.
2. State Legislative Reponses to Kelo
Since Kelo, a majority of states, including some that already
substantially restricted eminent domain before Kelo, have enacted,
considered, or are presently considering legislative or constitutional
measures to further restrict eminent domain. Some of these
enactments or proposals are of faux reforms, as Timothy Sandefur
has pointed out, which pretend to provide more protection against
eminent domain but, in reality, merely restate existing law. 153 But a
few of the enactments or proposals are quite significant.
Consider the four states that have actually enacted post-Kelo
eminent domain reform, discussed below in chronological order of
adoption.

151. SAMUEL R. STALEY & JOHN P. BLAIR, REASON FOUNDATION POLICY STUDY 331: EMINENT
DOMAIN, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND REDEVELOPMENT: AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS 4

(2005).
152. Professor Merrill has opined that the number of large-scale redevelopment projects, such as the
Fort Trumbull Project in New London, "is relatively small and concentrated in large congested cities
like New York, Boston or Baltimore." Paul Nowell, Regional Bank to Refitse Loans in Eminent Domain
Projects, Jan. 26,2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=l 138183513209.
153. Sandefur, supra note 14, at 17,20,22,45.
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Alabama was the first state to act after Kelo. 154 On August 3,
2005, Governor Bob Riley signed legislation unanimously
enacted in direct response to the Supreme Court's ruling. 155 The
statement of legislative intent provides the following:

e

In light of the decision and certain opinions recently announced
by the United States Supreme Court interpreting the extent of the
power of government to take property for public use as described
in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
providing that individual states may restrict the exercise of that
power, the Legislature intends in enacting this act to ensure that
governmental bodies in Alabama vested with all or any part of
the power of eminent domain may not.., use the power to take
the private property of any person for the private use of another,
as opposed to the use thereof by the public generally, except as
56
and in the limited circumstances set out in this act.'
The second section of Alabama's statute contained additional
strong language prohibiting the state and its subdivisions and
agencies from condemning land "for the purpose of
nongovernmental retail, office, commercial, residential, or
industrial development or use. ..."157 Had the Alabama legislature
left it at that, the statute would have constituted a strong limitation
on eminent domain, prohibiting governments from taking land for
a public purpose or a public benefit; the statute would have
restricted eminent domain to cases involving actual public use of
the land. However, the legislature added a crucial exception that, in
effect, gutted the rule:
[T]he foregoing provisions of this subsection shall not apply to
the exercise of the powers of eminent domain by any county,
municipality, housing authority, or other public entity based
154.
155.
156.
157.

See Donald Larnbro, Alabama Limits Eminent Domain, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at A01.
Id.
2005 Ala. Laws 313 (1st Spec. Sess.).
ALA. CODE § 18-1B-2(a) (2005).
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upon a finding of blight in an area covered by any
redevelopment plan or urban renewal plan pursuant to Chapters
2 and 3 of Title 24, Code of Alabama 1975.158

This exception effectively swallowed the rule, because chapters 2
and 3 of title 24 permit condemnation for urban renewal upon a
finding of economic blight or even to "prevent the spread of blight
159
or deterioration."
As a result of this single exception, the power of eminent domain
in Alabama is barely diminished. Alabama cities and their agencies
can continue to take private property for economic development,
so long as they can reasonably argue that the taking is necessary to
cure or prevent blight or deterioration. As Timothy Sandefur has
explained that
[t]he new law simply reiterates that the state may condemn
property only after it has followed the relatively simple
procedure of declaring the area blighted and preparing a
redevelopment plan ....All that the Alabama reform measure

seems to do is to prohibit direct transfers of property from A to B
for B's benefit alone; the state is now required to declare, with
some minimal plausibility, that the transfer will benefit society in
1 60
some general way.
Delaware Governor Ruth Ann Minner signed that state's eminent
domain reform statute into law on July 21, 2005.161 This brief
statute does not restrict what counts as a public use for purposes

158. Id.
159. Id. § 24-3-2(c)(2). The 2005 statute also provides for uncontroversial exceptions such as roadbuilding, public parks, and utility lines, which the Act probably would have permitted, even if not
specifically excepted. See id. § 18-1B-2(a).
160. Sandefur, supra note 14, at 20.
161. S.B. 217, 143rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2005) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§
9503, 9505(14)(2005)).
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of eminent domain, 162 but it does impose potentially costly
procedural requirements on governments and their agencies prior
to exercising eminent domain 163 and requires the government to
pay the attorneys' fees of condemnees. 164 The new procedural
requirements include six months' advance notice prior to the
commencement of condemnation proceedings, a public hearing
prior to condemnation, and publication of a report detailing the
purpose of the taking. These procedural requirements increase the
implicit cost of using eminent domain by creating a greater
opportunity for public involvement and political opposition. No
one should underestimate the potential importance of this
opportunity. Political processes can and do significantly affect
even legally valid eminent domain proceedings.
On September 1, 2005, Texas Governor Rick Perry signed into
law Senate Bill 7,166 which amended that state's system of
eminent domain in some significant and insignificant ways.
Among its less significant aspects, the Act prohibits the use of
eminent domain when the claimed public use is "merely a pretext
to confer a private benefit on a particular private party.' 67 United
States Supreme Court rulings, including Kelo, 6 8 already prohibit
such pretexts. More significantly, the Texas statute prohibits
eminent domain takings "for economic development purposes,
unless the economic development is a secondary purpose
resulting from municipal community development or municipal
urban renewal activities to eliminate an existing affirmative harm
on society from slum or blighted areas . . . ."169 Although this
162. Existing sections of the Delaware code permit the use of eminent domain for urban renewal. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, §§ 4501-4543 (2004) (focusing on section 4528, which addresses eminent
domain specifically). S.B. 217 does not amend those sections in any way.
163. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9505 (2004).
164. Id. § 9503.
165. See infra notes 225-32 and accompanying text (discussing how political pressures in the wake of
Kelo have stalled the Fort Trumbull Municipal Development Plan). But see Sandefur, supra note 14, at
26 (noting that "private property rights cannot be entrusted to the political process entirely," and
criticizing the Delaware statute for not providing additional legal safeguards against abuse of eminent
domain).
166. See Press Release, Tex. Pub. Policy Found., Governor Signs Eminent Domain Reform (Aug. 31,
2005), http://www.texaspolicy.com/press-releases-single.php?reportid-903.
167. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(bX2) (Vernon 2005).
168. See supra notes 53, 56 and accompanying text.
169. § 2206.001(b)(3) (emphasis added).
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section resembles the exception in the Alabama statute, it
arguably retains a greater limitation on eminent domain because,
in accordance with Justice O'Connor's dissent in Kelo, 17 ° it
requires a finding that existing uses are causing affirmative harm.
Thus, it goes beyond federal constitutional law, which does not
71
restrict the eminent domain power to nuisance-like cases.'
Moreover, the Texas statute specifies that courts are not to defer
to government determinations that existing uses are creating
affirmative harm or that the taking in other respects constitutes a
valid public use.' 72 Consequently, Texas law provides for more
intensive judicial review of eminent domain takings.
*

On November 16, 2005, Ohio Governor Bob Taft signed into law
S.B. 167,17 which imposed a limited moratorium on the use of
eminent domain:
Notwithstanding any provision of the Revised Code to the
contrary, until December 31, 2006, no public body shall use
eminent domain to take, without the consent of the owner,
private property that is not within a blighted area, as determined
by the public body, when the primary purpose for the taking is
economic development that will ultimately result in ownership of
74
that property being vested in another private person.
Section 8 of the statute declares that this moratorium is an
emergency measure necessitated by the Supreme Court's decision
in Kelo. 17 5 The purpose of the moratorium is to give the state time
to consider further legislative remedies for abuses of eminent
domain. 176 One might approve of Ohio's desire to avoid knee-jerk
reactions to Kelo by taking time to deliberate before imposing

170. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
171. The majority in Kelo expressly declined to adopt such a limitation. See supra note 76 and
accompanying text. But see Sandefur, supra note 14, at 22 (arguing that section 2206.001(bX3) does not
significantly alter existing law).
172. § 2206.001(b)(3).
173. S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).
174. Id. § 2(A).
175. Id.§8.
176. Id.
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substantive reforms to its eminent domain law. However, it seems
fairly clear that Ohio's moratorium is little more than a political
smokescreen, designed to create the impression of outrage without
actually doing anything significant about the law. For one thing,
the moratorium only applies to a small fraction of eminent domain
actions: those where the government condemns unblighted land for
private economic development.' 77 Importantly, given the stated
purpose of the Ohio legislation, this moratorium might not have
prevented the City of New London from taking Susette Kelo's
home, because her home arguably was in a blighted area as the
Ohio Code defines that term in section 303.26 and in court
rulings. 178 Consequently, as a reporter for the CincinnatiEnquirer
noted, no one expected the moratorium to have much of an impact
79
on development projects. 1
Beyond the four states that have actually enacted legislation in
response to Kelo, at least 18 other states-Arkansas,' 80 California,' 886'
Florida,'

82

Illinois, 183

Kentucky,'4

Maine, 185

Massachusetts,'

177. Id. § 2(B)(1).
178. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 303.26(E) (West 2005). Blighted area means an area within a
county but outside the corporate limits of any municipality, which area by reason of the presence of a
substantial number of slum, deteriorated, or deteriorating structures, predominance of defective or
inadequate street layout, faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility, or usefulness,
unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site or other improvements, diversity of ownership, tax
or special assessment delinquency exceeding the fair value of the land, defective or unusual conditions
to title, or the existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any
combination of such factors, substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of a county, retards the
provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a menace to
the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its present condition and use. Id. The Ohio moratorium
statute expressly provides that "[b]lighted area ... also includes an area in a municipal corporation."
S.B. 167 § I(A), 126th Gen Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005). In City of Norwood v. Homey, the court
ruled that "blighted" includes areas that are "deteriorating," as well as those that are actually unsafe. 830
N.E.2d 381, 388 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
179. Steve Kemme, Ohio Imposing Moratorium on Eminent Domain, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov.
17, 2005, at 2C; see also Sandefur, supranote 14, at 30-31.
180. H.B. 2735,85th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2005).
181. S.Const. Amend. 12, 2005 State Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); S. Const. Amend. 15, 2005
State Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); Assem. B. 590, 2005 State Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); Assem.
B. 1162, 2005 State Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005); S.B. 1026, 2005 State Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2005).
182. S.J. Res. 20, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006).
183. H.B. 4091, 94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (111.2005).
184. B. Res. 134,2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006).
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Michigan,' 87 Minnesota, 18 8 Nevada, 189 New Jersey, 190 New York, 191
193 Rhode Island, 194 South Carolina, 195
Oregon, 192 Pennsylvania,
Virginia, 196 and Wisconsin'97-are actively considering legislative
proposals as of February 2006. At least nine other states-Alaska,
Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, and West Virginia-have either announced intentions to
enact legislation, are currently drafting legislation, or have appointed
panels or task forces to study the problem and make legislative
recommendations. 198 Interestingly, the State of Connecticut, where
Kelo arose, has already rejected legislation that would have imposed
limits on the use of eminent domain for private development or
redevelopment projects. 199
Some new legislative proposals seem designed to create an
impression of reform without really making any significant changes
in the law or practice of eminent domain. For example, a proposed
amendment to California's state constitution (one of four legislative
proposals currently being considered in that state) provides that
"public use does not include the taking of owner-occupied residential
property for private use., 20 0 If adopted, this amendment would not
change existing law in any significant way. As the Supreme Court
185. Leg. Doc. 1203, 122d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2005).
186. Bradley H. Jones, Jr., A Resolution Supporting Private Property Rights in Massachusetts and
Protecting Them from Abuse of the Right of Taking By
Eminent Domain,
http://cltg.org/cltg/property/Jones%20Resolution%2on%20Eminent/20Domain.pdf. (last visited Apr.
9, 2006).
187. H.B. 5060, 93d Leg., 1st Reg. Seass. (Mich. 2005).
188. H. File No. 2586, 84th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005).
189. S.B. 326, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2005).
190. S.2739, 211 th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2005).
191. Assem. B. 9144,228th Leg., Reg. Seass. (N.Y. 2005).
192. H.B. 3505, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005).
193. H.B. 2054, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005).
194. S.Res. 1237, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2005).
195. H.B. 4295, 116th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Seass. (S.C. 2005).
196. H.B. 1806, 2005 Gen. Assem., 2005 Sess. (Va. 2005).
197. Assem. B. 657,97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005).
198. See Castle Coalition: Legislative Center, http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/index.html
(last visited Apr. 9, 2006) (reporting the status of legislative proposals, plans, and studies to reform
eminent domain law in various states).
199. See Lawmakers Reject 11th-Hour Eminent Domain Bill, WTNH.cOM (Conn.), June 28, 2005,
http://www.wtnh.com/Global/story.asp?S=3533009.
200. S.Const. Amend. 12, 2005 State Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005).
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reaffirmed in Kelo, current eminent domain doctrine does not allow
the taking of private property for private use. 20 1 Proposed legislation
in Kentucky also would not change state law in any way; it merely
urges Congress to pass federal legislation to restrict state and local
governments from using eminent domain for purposes of economic
20 2
development.
Legislative proposals in several states, however, would
substantially reform eminent domain, making it more difficult for
municipalities to take private land for purposes of economic
development. Here are just three examples:
*

In Illinois, House Bill 4091 would restrict eminent domain to
"qualified public use[s]," which the bill expressly defines to
exclude
eminent domain to acquire property for private ownership or
control, including for economic development, unless acquisition
of property for private ownership or control is (i) for a public
purpose and (ii) specifically and expressly authorized by law
enacted by the General Assembly on, before, or after the
effective date of this amendatory Act ....
203

" It might not be difficult for local planners to meet condition (i),
but condition (ii) would seem to require affirmative legislative
permission before any eminent domain takings, other than those
for actual public use, could proceed.
*

Senate Bill 2739, currently before the New Jersey legislature,
simply provides, without exception, that "no property that is
legally occupied as residential property and maintained in
accordance with applicable housing codes and standards shall be
subject to condemnation. '2 °4 Part 4 of the bill reiterates that

201. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
202. See B. Res. 134, § 1, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006). Whether Congress has such authority is
questionable. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
203. H.B. 4091, § 10(b), 94th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11.
2005).
204. S.2739, at 2,211th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2005).
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governments cannot condemn such properties even pursuant to
duly adopted redevelopment plans.2 °5
*

The Pennsylvania House of Representatives, on November 1,
2005, passed House Bill 2054, which, like the Texas statute
discussed earlier,20 6 would limit the use of eminent domain to
blighted properties, while defining "blight" narrowly to include
only properties that are vacant, unimproved, or actually pose a
threat to public health or safety.20 7 Moreover, the Pennsylvania
legislation prohibits the use of eminent domain "to take private
208
property in order to use it for private commercial enterprise."
The bill provides limited exceptions, however, for incidental
private uses,
such as newsstands or gift shops in government
20 9
buildings.

These bills, if enacted, could impose real and substantial
limitations on the power of eminent domain. The Pennsylvania and
Illinois bills would limit eminent domain far more substantially than
would the dissenters from Kelo (excepting Justice Thomas). As we
have seen, Justice O'Connor's dissent would merely limit the use of
eminent domain for purposes of redevelopment to cases where the
government can show that the existing use is harmful (e.g., a
nuisance). 2 That is basically what New Jersey's Senate Bill 2739
would accomplish, albeit with a more precise definition of what
constitutes a harmful use. The Illinois and Pennsylvania legislation
would go farther. Illinois House Bill 4091 would require affirmative
legislation to approve any future use of eminent domain for economic
development purposes. Pennsylvania House Bill 2054 would
basically limit the use of eminent domain to cases involving actual
public use of the property to be taken. Of course, we do not know

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 8, 9.
See supranotes 166-72 and accompanying text.
H.B. 2054, § 205(b), 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005).
Id. § 204(a).
Id. § 204(b).
See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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whether these legislatures will enact any of these legislative
proposals.
3. Kelo in Congress
Although local governments are the primary users of eminent
domain, state and local economic development projects often receive
federal funding. Thus, Kelo has political implications for the federal
government, state, and local governments. Claiming that their
constituents are outraged by Kelo, members of the House and Senate
from both political parties have taken potshots at the Court and
proposed federal restrictions on eminent domain. The Kelo
controversy even found its way into the Senate hearings for Supreme
Court nominees John Roberts (now Chief Justice Roberts) and
Samuel Alito (now Associate Justice Alito). 211 The scope of
Congress's constitutional authority to restrict states' eminent domain
power is uncertain. 2 12 However, there is no question that Congress
can choose to curtail federal funding for state and local development
projects if it chooses. On November 3, 2005, the House of
Representatives voted overwhelmingly (376-38) to pass House
Resolution 4128, the Private Property Rights Protection Act of
2005.213 The bill would prohibit states and their political subdivisions
from using eminent domain for economic development in any fiscal
214
year in which they receive federal economic development funding.
Any state found to have violated this prohibition would be ineligible
for federal economic development funds for two fiscal years, and the

211. See Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to the US. Supreme Court Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006), 2006 WL 53273; Hearing on the Nomination of John
Roberts to Be ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(2005), 2005 WL 2237049.
212. See Bernard W. Bell, Legislatively Revising Kelo v. City of New London: Eminent Domain,
Federalism, and CongressionalPowers (Rutgers Law School, Working Paper No. 28, 2005), available
at http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/fp/art28.
213. Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); see
Shaheen Pasha, Eminent Domain Looks Less Imminent: House Passes Bill That Could Prevent Private
Industry
from
Using
Land
Seizures,
CNNMONEY.COM,
Nov.
4,
2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/1 1/04/news/economy/eminent-domain_bill/.
214. Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, § 2(b), 109th Cong. (Ist Sess. 2005).
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state would have to return any federal funds already received. 215 The
bill would also prohibit the federal government and its agencies from
using eminent domain for economic development purposes. 216 That
provision has little significance, however, because the federal
government rarely uses eminent domain for any purpose, let alone
economic development.217 A companion bill in the Senate is currently
before the Committee on the Judiciary.218 If House Resolution 4128
becomes law, there is little doubt that it would have a significantperhaps dramatic-effect on the rate of eminent domain takings and
219
economic development and redevelopment projects.
4. Local Governments (andDevelopers and Lenders) Restrain
Themselves After Kelo
Although state and federal legislative responses to Kelo might be
understandable, perhaps even predictable, it is quite surprising to find
that a few local governments have responded to Kelo by preventing
themselves, through municipal ordinances, from using eminent
domain for economic development. After all, it is local governments
that most often use and supposedly abuse eminent domain. If those
governments want to prevent the use of eminent domain for
economic development, all they have to do is stop employing it as a
tool. But in the wake of Kelo, some municipalities have decided to
make a point of legally preventing themselves from exercising
eminent domain.
On August 22, 2005, the Town Council of Wethersfield,
Connecticut voted unanimously to limit its own use of eminent
domain. 220 Chapter 12 of the Wethersfield code of ordinances now
215. Id.
216. Id.§3.
217. But see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (constituting an exceptional case of federal
eminent domain, as the case arose in the federal city of Washington, D.C.).
218. See Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (as
referred to S. Comm.).
219. Cf. Sandefur, supranote 14, at 35.
220. G.C. Gould, Town Votes to Limit Eminent Domain Powers, WETHERSFIELD POST (Conn.), Sept.
at
available
2005,
2,
=
=
http://www.zwire.com/site/printerFriendly.cfin?brd 1662&deptid l 1233&newsid=15144317.
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reads: "no owner-occupied residential real property consisting of four
or fewer dwelling units may be acquired by eminent domain for
economic development purposes pursuant to General Statutes 8-128
to 8-133 inclusive, if the resulting project will be privately owned or
controlled., 22 1 The Board of Aldermen of Woodfin, North Carolina
(population 3,162222) passed a resolution on August 16, 2005
opposing the Supreme Court's decision in the Kelo case, resolving
223
not to use eminent domain "outside of a true 'public use' context."
Obviously, Woodfin's resolution is less self-restrictive than the
ordinance passed in Wethersfield, Connecticut.
The oddest post-Kelo measure enacted by a municipality comes
from South Kingstown, Rhode Island. On September 12, 2005, the
Town Council of South Kingstown unanimously agreed to adopt a
resolution asking Rhode Island legislators to pass a state law to
prevent local governments from taking land for economic
development. 224 Apparently, the town council did not trust itself to
exercise self-restraint in the use of eminent domain; it asked the state
to help restrain it from doing what all the members of the council
agreed it should not do. Or perhaps the town council was rationally
concerned with regulatory competition among all Rhode Island
towns. If Kingstown restricted eminent domain but other, similarsized towns did not, those towns might gain from additional
economic development opportunities at Kingstown's expense.
No doubt, the number of cities and towns that have imposed legal
limitations on their own use of eminent domain is so small as to be
insignificant. But even in the vast majority of cities-large and
small-that have not officially responded to Kelo, the backlash from
the Supreme Court's decision is clearly having a chilling effect on the
use of eminent domain. Nowhere is this more evident than in the City
of New London. As of the end of February 2006, the City of New
221. Id.
222. See Woodfin, North Carolina, http://www.city-data.com/city/Woodfin-North-Carolina.html (last
visited Apr. 9, 2006).
223. Leslie Boyd, Woodfin Decides to Restrict Eminent Domain, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Aug.
17, 2005, at lB.
224. See Katie Mulvaney, Council Moves to Block Seizures for Development, PROVIDENCE J., Sept.
13, 2005, at COI.

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:803

London has not evicted Susette Kelo from her home, nor any of the
other plaintiffs in the case from their homes or businesses.225 Some
believe the city will never evict them. According to the New York
Times, New London and the State of Connecticut have grown so
"wary of public disapproval," that they have "halted plans to evict the
remaining residents., 226 Even though the plaintiffs lost the eight-year
legal battle, the New York Times asserts that they gained a
tremendous amount of political leverage. 227 Indeed, one of the
plaintiffs, Bill Von Winkle, is so confident the city will not evict him
that he recently put a new roof on the legally condemned threebuilding apartment complex he owns. 228 The New York Times also
229
reports that renters are moving into, not out of, those buildings.
Meanwhile, the private investors in the Fort Trumbull project have
become "concerned about building on land that some people consider
a symbol of property rights." 230 The president of Corcoran Jennison,
the private development firm hired as general contractor for the
project by the NLDC, announced that any further development of the
Fort Trumbull area will take place "away from the area where the
holdouts remain. ' 2 31 Most recently, the City of New London hired a
mediator to seek a compromise with the remaining residents of Fort
Trumbull.232 In short, the city is acting as if it did not win the Kelo
case.
A thousand miles away from New London, in St. Louis, Missouri,
the same chilling effect has stalled a redevelopment project that
involved the replacement of homes, some of which the city
condemned by eminent domain, with a shopping center.233 The
225. William Yardley, After Eminent Domain Victory, Disputed Project Goes Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 2005, at Al.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.Concern with property rights is not the only reason the plan has stalled; there have also been
contract disputes and financial problems. See Yardley, supranote 225.
231. Id.
232. Warren Richey, Battle Over Property Rights Goes On, Despite Ruling, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 4, 2006, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0104/p02s0l-ussc.html.
233. Eric Heisler, Ruling Has Unexpected Effect Here-ItStalls Projects, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Aug. 28, 2005, at BI.
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backlash against Kelo killed that project and one other in the St.
Louis area. 2 34 According to a report in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
"[a]cross St. Louis and the nation, the court's controversial June 23
[Kelo] decision initially was viewed as a win for developers and
cities-and a crushing blow for small property owners. So far, it
hasn't worked out that way." 235 According to Maplewood, Missouri
City Manager Martin Corcoran, after Kelo, eminent domain suddenly
became harder to use. 236 And it is not just Missouri city officials who
are "listening to what people are saying. ' 237 Florissant, Missouri
Mayor Robert Lowery adds that developers too "are worried about
the adverse publicity., 238 So are commercial lenders. On January 25,
2006, BB&T, the country's ninth largest financial holdings company
with $109.2 billion in assets, announced that it would no longer
finance development projects involving lands taken from private
citizens by eminent domain. 239 Banks naturally would be reluctant to
invest in politically controversial projects that well-funded property
rights advocates could tie up for years in litigation.
5. But Will the Kelo "Backlash " Last?
No one knows whether the post-Kelo "chilling effect" on the use of
eminent domain for economic development and redevelopment is a
permanent condition or a temporary interruption to the usual business
of takings. Some property rights advocates fear that eminent domain
reform is already losing steam. The Heritage Foundation's Ronald D.
Utt believes:

234. Id.

235. Id.
236. Id.

237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Institute for Justice, BB&T Respects Property Rights, Won't Fund Eminent Domain Abuse,

Jan. 25, 2006, http://www.ij.orgleditorial/bbt-wont-fund-ED.html. Because BB&T loans money almost
exclusively to consumers and small businesses and does not finance large commercial developments, no
one expects this commitment to have any effect on the company's bottom line. See Nowell, supra note
152.
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Despite the widespread concern that swept the country following
the Kelo decision, state and federal elected officials have done
little to strengthen the protection of property rights. With the
exceptions of the House bill and new laws in Alabama and
Texas, property rights initiatives in other states and in the U.S.
Senate have been bogged down in legislative committees, in
large part due to opposition from mayors, developers, and
economic development officials who stand to see their power
diminished. To date, President Bush has been silent on the issue,
despite its popular appeal and property rights' status as a basic
principle of individual freedom.240
A more sober appraisal would suggest, however, that the Kelo
backlash has been remarkably productive in the short period of time
since the Supreme Court issued its ruling in June of 2005. In less than
a year, four states have enacted laws of various significance in
response to Kelo.2 4 1 Congress has passed legislation in one house that
is currently pending in the other.242 Dozens of other states have
drafted legislation that it is currently under consideration; and in a
majority of the remaining states, legislation currently is being drafted
or planned.243 Meanwhile, as Timothy Sandefur has noted, "most
state legislatures have been out of session since the backlash
began.",244 Given the general inertia of most legislative processes,
eminent domain reform has been a great success so far. However,
whether the Kelo backlash will maintain its steam over the long run is
anyone's guess.

240. Utt, supra note 96. Dr. Utt seems somewhat perplexed by President Bush's silence on Kelo, but
he should not be. The entire eminent domain issue is discomfiting to the President. When he owned the
Texas Rangers baseball team, George W. Bush was given the power of eminent domain to condemn
land to build a new, privately-owned stadium, which greatly increased the net value of his franchise.
See, e.g., Dave McNeely, Bush Can Expect Past Questions To Be Raised Again, AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN, Aug. 29, 1998, at A13.
241. Sandefur, supra note 14, at 17.
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 180-98 and accompanying text.
244. Sandefur, supra note 14, at 17.
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III. EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CONTEXT: How
AND WHY POLITICIANS (AND NOT JUST JUDGES) PROTECT PRIVATE
PROPERTY RIGHTS

245

A. JudicialDistrustof PoliticalInstitutions
Since America's founding, native jurists have commonly assumed
that judicial protection is absolutely crucial to the perpetuation of
private property, an institution that is fundamental to both individual
liberty and economic development. 246 The likes of Justices Holmes,
Scalia, and most recently, O'Connor have argued that, in the absence
of zealous judicial oversight, even well-meaning political bodies
would slowly (or even quickly) erode private property, until it
247
disappeared entirely.
According to the legal historian James Ely, James Madison drafted
the Takings Clause out of concern that property owners might
become a "vulnerable minority," whose rights the majority could
abuse. 248 By inserting a Takings Clause into the Constitution,
Madison hoped to increase political respect for private property
rights. 249 He also hoped that "[i]ndependent tribunals of justice ...
[would] consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of
those rights

.

.

.

they will naturally be led to resist every

encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution
250
by the declaration of rights."
Like Madison, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was concerned
about the majoritarian abuse of property rights. 25' In his famous 1922
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Holmes wrote that when
the Constitution's "seemingly absolute protection" of private
245. See Cole, supra note 5. Parts of this section are adapted from arguments laid out in greater detail
in that article.
246. Id. at 1.
247. See Cole, supra note 5; supra Part ll.B.2.
248. Cole, supra note 5. John Adams agreed with Madison about this. Adams claimed that ending
property-qualifications for voting rights would "lead the many to pillage the propertied few." SEAN
WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 188 (2005).
249. Cole, supra note 5.
250. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS 56 (1992).
25 1. Cole, supra note 5.
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property "is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural
tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and
more until at last private property disappears. ' 25 2 To avoid that
unacceptable outcome, Holmes introduced the regulatory takings
doctrine (although he did not call it that) into U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence.253
Seventy years later, Justice Antonin Scalia reiterated in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council Holmes's concern about political
incursions on private property.254 Scalia doubted that legislatures
would sincerely distinguish between compensable eminent domain
takings and noncompensable police power regulations. 25 5 Legislative
bodies, he opined, will always seek to impose burdens on discrete
private landowners and avoid paying compensation whenever they
can get away with it. 256 "Since ... a [police power] justification can
be formulated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of
' 257
whether the legislature has a stupid staff.
Significantly, in Kelo, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor quoted from
Justice Scalia's Lucas opinion, but in a different context. 258 In Lucas,
Scalia was concerned about the choice between eminent domain and
the police power and the effect that choice has on just compensation.
Kelo was not a case where the government was seeking to avoid
paying compensation by couching its action in police power terms.
Rather, Justice O'Connor quoted Scalia's reference to "stupid
staffers" in arguing against Justice Kennedy's "undisclosed test" to
determine whether the economic benefit from an eminent domain
taking is primarily, or only incidentally, public. 259 In other words,
Justice O'Connor does not trust public bodies to determine whether a
taking by eminent domain is truly for public use. They will always
claim a legitimate public use, she suggests; consequently, the courts
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
Cole, supra note 5.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Id. at 1026.
Id.
Id. at 1025 n.12.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2675 (2005).
Id.
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must rigorously enforce the Public Use Clause. This is a principled
position, but like Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas and Justice
Holmes's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal, it underestimates the extent
to which the political process itself can, and does, protect private
property rights.
B. PoliticalProtectionof PrivateProperty
Imagine private property in a country without a Takings Clause,
without a Public Use Clause, without a Just Compensation Clause,
without any constitutional judicial review of legislation affecting
property rights. In such a country, would the institution of private
property survive? Many, if not most, American jurists would predict,
as Justice Holmes did, that it would not. However, Justice Holmes
and most other American jurists have considered the question only in
the abstract, without assessing the available evidence. In fact, we do
not need to imagine a country without constitutional judicial review
of legislation, without a Takings Clause, Public Use Clause, or Just
Compensation Clause; we need only look to the history of the United
Kingdom, where for more than 300 years (since the constitutional
settlement following the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89), property
rights have existed without any of the constitutional and judicial
institutions we take for granted in the United States.26 °
In the United Kingdom, Parliament possesses plenary authority
over property rights, to take property from anyone for public or
private use, with or without compensation.26 ' If Parliament expressly
chooses to take property from one private owner, X, and transfer it to
another private owner, Y, without compensating X, the courts have no
legal authority either to prevent it or to require compensation. 262 Even

260. Cole, supra note 5.
261. Id.
262. See Cole, supra note 5. That article presents a thorough historical and theoretical treatment of the
respective roles of Parliament and the courts relating to property rights. In the United States, this
legislative action would violate both the Public Use Clause (after Kelo) and the Just Compensation
Clause.
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after the enactment of the 1998 Human Rights Act, 263 parliamentary
264
sovereignty remains intact; the courts cannot overturn legislation.
Needless to say, private property still exists in the United
Kingdom. Indeed, the institution of private property is virtually as
well protected there as here because Parliament itself protects
property rights with self-imposed rules that resemble, to a great
extent, existing Supreme Court doctrines under the Takings
Clause. 265 For example, when Parliament takes title to property by
eminent domain, it virtually always pays compensation, even though
it is not constitutionally required to do so. 266 However, when
Parliament regulates property pursuant to its police powers, it
provides compensation only in exceptional circumstances. 267 One
such exceptional circumstance arises when a government denies
planning permission to develop land, leaving the landowner without
any reasonably beneficial use. In such cases, under the 1947 Town
and Country Planning Act (as amended), the landowner can force
compulsory purchase by the government. 268 Thus, had the American
case of Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Commission269 arisen in the
270
United Kingdom, it would have come out exactly the same way.
The only difference is that in the United Kingdom, Parliament
created the doctrine of compulsory purchase by ordinary legislation,
and in the United States, inverse condemnation developed out of

263. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
264. See Cole, supra note 5. The courts can declare that a piece of legislation violates the Human
Rights Act, but it is up to Parliament to repeal the offending law. Moreover, Parliament can always
legislate exceptions to the Human Rights Act, which might be repealed in whole at any time. Id.
265. Id..
266. Id..
267. Id.
268. Id..
269. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
270. Cole, supra note 5. The planning law scholar and current President and Provost of University
College London, Malcolm Grant, adds that under the United Kingdom's Town and Country Planning
Act, as interpreted in Pyr Granite v. Minister of Hous. & Local Gov't, [1958] 1 Q.B. 554, rev 'don other
grounds, [1960] A.C. 260, the American case of Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), would
have been resolved in favor of Mrs. Dolan. Malcolm Grant, If Tigard Were an English City: Exactions
Law in England Following the Tesco Case, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND
REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUcAS 332, 350 (David L. Callies ed., 1996). Specifically,
Professor Grant notes that British planners could not have imposed on Mrs. Dolan what the City of
Tigard sought to impose on her development. Id.
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constitutional protections for private property, as interpreted and
enforced by the courts. 2 7 1 But why would Parliament refrain from
taking property without compensation, and why would it create legal
rights of compulsory purchase, in the absence of constitutional
requirements enforced by the courts? Do they simply have "stupid
staffers," as Justices Scalia and O'Connor might have suggested?
Additional empirical support for the proposition that political
institutions substantially protect property rights comes from the
United States itself, where Congress and various state legislatures
have proven to be quite solicitous of vested property interests.
According to a 1995 Congressional Research Service Report,
Congress has long endeavored to avoid unsettling the economic
expectations of property owners when it enacts regulatory statutes.272
2 73
Many statutes include grandfather clauses to protect vested rights.

More generally, the 1970 Uniform Relocation Act requires that
Congress design federal programs (or federally funded state
programs) to minimize displacement of property owners.27" In cases
where federal programs cannot avoid taking property, the Act
provides for additional compensation, beyond what is constitutionally
required, for incidental losses such as moving expenses and re27
establishment of displaced businesses. 5
American states, too, have sought to protect property rights
through legislation. During the 1990s, for example, virtually every
state in the country considered enacting takings legislation. Most bills
276
were rejected, but 21 states adopted some type of takings statute.
The predominant type merely required the Attorney General or

271. Cole, supra note 5.
272. Robert Meltz, CRS Report for Congress 95-200A: The Property Rights Issue (Jan. 20, 1995),
http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/economics/econ- II .cfin.
273. Id. Of course, such grandfather clauses may be inspired by the existence of the Takings Clause.
That is to say, legislation may seek to avoid interfering with vested property rights simply to avoid
liability for compensable takings. The key, and unanswerable, question is whether Congress would be as
solicitous of vested property rights were it not legislating in the shadow of the Fifth Amendment.
274. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (2000).
275. § 4622. Even though it only applies in a narrow set of circumstances and may now be out of date
in terms of its coverage and benefits, this statute still provides greater protection for covered property
interests than the Constitution requires.
276. Cole, supra note 5.
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relevant state agency to review proposed regulations for their impact
on property rights. But five states-Florida,277 Louisiana,278
Mississippi, 2 79 Texas, 28
and
Oregon 28'-adopted
takings
compensation statutes, which purported to provide more
compensation for regulatory takings than required under existing
Supreme Court doctrine. For example, the Florida statute provides
that the government has to pay compensation whenever some
regulation "inordinately burden[s]" use of private property. 282 A
landowner is inordinately burdened if she is "permanently unable to
attain the reasonable, investment-backed expectations for the . . .
property," or if she "bears permanently a disproportionate share of a
burden imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness should
be borne by the public at large. 283 This language tracks Supreme
Court precedents,284 but the framers of Florida's statute expressly
contemplated that the state statute should apply more liberally. 285 In
Texas, the 1995 Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act
defines a taking to include any state government action (other than
regulations of common-law nuisances and "grave and immediate
threat[s] to life or property" 286) that reduces the value of property by
25% or more.287 When such a taking occurs, the state has the choice
of either rescinding the regulation or paying compensation.288 Under
Oregon's Measure 37, adopted by public referendum in 2004, the
277. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (West 2005).
278. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3601 to :3612 (2003).
279. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-1 to -17 (West 1999).
280. TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001 - .045 (Vernon 2005).
281. STATE OF OREGON 2004 GENERAL ELECTION VOTERS' PAMPHLET Measure 37, at 103 (2004),
availableat http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/
meas/m37.text.htmi. [hereinafter Measure 37].
282. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(2) (West 2005).
283. Id. § 70.001(3Xe).
284. See Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (noting the
significance, in takings claims, of "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations"); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (noting that the
"Fifth Amendment's guarantee... [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole").
285. See § 70.001(9) (providing that statutory causes of action might exist for "governmental actions
that may not rise to the level of a taking under the State Constitution or the United States Constitution").
286. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2007.003(bX6), (7) (Vernon 2005).
287. Id. § 2007.002(5).
288. Id. §§ 2007.023(b)-.024(c).
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state has to either pay compensation or exempt private properties
from (non-nuisance based) land-use regulations, whenever those
regulations reduce the value of private property by any amount.2 8 9
Most states also have relocation assistance laws that typically
provide greater financial assistance than the U.S. Constitution
29
mandates when governments take properties by eminent domain. 0
Under some of these laws, residential tenants may actually benefit
most. According to a federal study of forced relocations, "[a]ll but
one of the tenants surveyed reported that they were able to
'significantly upgrade' their housing as a result of the assistance, and
a substantial majority of tenants reported that they were fully
291
reimbursed for all of the costs associated with the relocation."
Residential renters certainly are not a politically powerful group, yet
the political process seems to have protected their property interests
substantially.
The various state takings laws and relocation assistance statutes
discussed above provide further evidence that both political bodies
and courts protect private property rights. Indeed, legislatively
imposed limitations are potentially stronger and farther reaching than
existing constitutional constraints.
Aside from legislative measures, the political process itself
substantially protects private property rights. In the last section, we
saw that the political backlash against Kelo discouraged local
politicians (who are, of course, subject to electoral replacement),
developers, and commercial lenders from engaging in politically
sensitive development and redevelopment projects. Kelo's strong
national resonance might (or might not) be unique, but politicians,
developers, and commercial lenders are always averse to bad
publicity. Meanwhile, political controversy is a more or less constant
feature of major development and redevelopment projects.

289. Measure 37, supra note 281. On February 21, 2006, the Oregon State Supreme Court upheld
Measure 37 against a state constitutional challenge. MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., 130 P.2d
308 (Or. 2006).
290. See Garnett,supra note 89, at 25-28.
291. Id. at 29 (citing U.S. DEP'TOFTRANSp., RELOCATION RETROSPECTIVE STUDY app. (1996)).
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Consider, for example, Professor Nicole Stelle Garnett's study of
the use of eminent domain in the construction of Chicago's
expressways during the 1940s. 292 She notes that "expressway routes
were altered at least three . . . times to preserve the geographic
integrity of parish boundaries, 293 and several churches in the path of
the Dan Ryan and Kennedy expressways were saved.294 Why did the
Chicago churches and parishes succeed in avoiding condemnation?
Professor Garnett offers two reasons: (1) at the time the State of
Illinois built the expressways, priests were prominent local leaders,
and Roman Catholics comprised a majority of Chicago's voters; and
(2) people are emotionally attached to their churches (i.e., churches
have high subjective value) and they are willing to fight intensely to
preserve them, which raises the costs of condemnation. 295 Garnett
believes that relatively high-valued properties generally are well
protected in the political process, especially if the owners are able
and willing to fight to save them.296 However, "[t]akers may be least
concerned with avoiding the subjective losses of those political
outsiders, including racial minorities and the poor, who are not
attached to cohesive communities." 297 Thus, the entire class of
property owners does not constitute a vulnerable minority, subject to
a high risk of expropriation and under-compensation. Only a subset
of that class-those with little political clout who own low-valued
properties-is highly vulnerable. Even that subset, however, may
effectively fight for its property rights in the political process if it
constitutes a cohesive community capable of engaging in collective

292. See Garnett, supranote 89.
293. Id. at 17 (citing STEVEN M. AVELLA, THIS CONFIDENT CHURCH 217 (1992)).
294. Id. at 16-18.
295. See id.at 17, 19. Emotional attachment to churches was not enough to help residents of Poletown
in Detroit when, in the late 1970s, the City decided to take their entire neighborhood, including its
churches, so that General Motors could construct a new Cadillac production plant. See Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). In that case, however, the
archdiocese of Detroit sold them to the City for demolition, ending any possibility of collective action to
save them. Conflicting interests between the church authorities and the parishioners obstructed the
community's efforts to save its churches. Garnett, supra note 89, at 22-23.
296. Garnett, supra note 89, at 22.
297. Id. at 24.
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action, like the church parishes on Chicago's south side during
expressway construction.
Judge Richard Posner agrees that private property owners are
generally quite capable of protecting their interests in political and
legislative processes. 298 In his recent foreword to the annual Supreme
Court issue of the HarvardLaw Review, Judge Posner wrote:
Property owners and the advocates of property rights are not
some helpless, marginalized minority. They have plenty of
political muscle, which they are free to use, since there is no
constitutional impediment to the government's declining to
exercise the full range of powers that the Constitution, as
299
interpreted by the Supreme Court, allows it.
In Judge Posner's view, "the strong adverse public and legislative
reactions to the Kelo decision are evidence of its pragmatic
300
soundness."
The economist William Fischel has provided a more elaborate
model of the political protection of private property. Like Posner, he
believes that private property owners generally are quite capable of
protecting their interests in political processes; they are not a
3 1
vulnerable minority, likely to be harmed by majoritarian excesses. 0
In Fischel's view, property owners constitute an economic interest
group, capable of forming alliances "to protect themselves from
short-sighted populism." 30 2 This claim is consistent with economic
theories of collective action, which posit that discrete interest groups
can coalesce around an issue of great importance to the group and
exert disproportionate influence on the political process, compared to
larger, more diffuse groups, including the general public. 30 3 Fischel
298. See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term: Foreword:A Political Court, 119 HARV.
L. REv. 31 (2005).
299. Id. at 98.
300. Id.
301.

See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 180 (1995).

302. Id.
303. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE

THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
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repudiates the general judicial distrust of legislatures, finding that in
many circumstances, especially in larger jurisdictions, "political
action, which is often disparaged as rent-seeking, is sufficient to
protect property without the help of judges." 304 By contrast, in
smaller jurisdictions, such as cities, voting majorities may jeopardize
the property rights of disfavored minorities, such as developers who
want to build low-income housing in otherwise affluent areas. 30 5 In
Fischel's model, judicial review is most important to police property
rights at lower levels of government, where the risk of majoritarian
bias is the highest. 30 6 At higher levels of government, however,

Fischel doubts the ability of judges to do a better job of protecting
30 7
private property rights than the political process itself.

Interestingly, Kelo does not conform to Fischel's presumption that
majoritarian bias is a key problem for property rights in smaller
jurisdictions. 308 Kelo was not a typical zoning case, where a local
voting majority used its political muscle to keep out unwanted
development. To the contrary, Kelo has been portrayed as a case
involving minoritarian bias, as well-heeled private developers
supposedly influenced local officials to act on behalf of their private
interest, while proclaiming some ostensible public purpose or
benefit. 30 9 At least one commentator has suggested, without noticing

304. FISCHEL, supra note 301, at 324.
305. Id.
306. Fischel's normative model tracks the situation in the United Kingdom, which provides for no
constitutional judicial review of national legislation but substantial statutory judicial review of lower
government decision-making to ensure it conforms to parliamentary intent. See Cole, supra note 5.
307. FISCHEL, supra note 301, at 317. This is a perspective shared by the legal scholar Neil Komesar,
even though Komesar does not believe the political process does a very good job of protecting property
rights. See NEIL KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF
RIGHTS (2001). For a detailed review of Komesar's thesis and its relation to Fischel's model, see Daniel
H. Cole, Taking Coase Seriously: Neil Komesar on Law's Limits, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 261 (2004).
308. To be fair, Fischel's model is arguably inapplicable to cases like Kelo involving eminent domain.
Fischel developed his model as part of a theory of regulatory takings law, which endeavors to determine
when to pay compensation for purported police power regulations.
309. See, e.g., Timothy P. Carney, Big Government Business, AM. SPECTATOR, June 30, 2005,
http://spectator.org/dsparicle.asp?artid=8366 (referring to the Kelo ruling as "just another win for the
unholy alliance of Big Business and Big Government" over individual private property owners and
small businesses).
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the incoherence, that the problem of eminent domain, represented by
310
Kelo, involves both majoritarian and minoritarian biases.
Once again, however, it is worth noting that Mrs. Kelo and the
other plaintiffs are still in their homes and businesses in the Fort
Trumbull neighborhood, more than six months after the Supreme
Court upheld the eminent domain actions against them.3 1' It is not at
312
all clear that minoritarian bias won the war in New London.
CONCLUSION: MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT AND REDEVELOPMENT IN

THE WAKE OF KELO

Kelo is far more important for its political salience than its legal
holding. In the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens spoke for the
majority, but in the country at large, Justice O'Connor's dissent
spoke for many, if not most, American citizens who are concerned
that local politicians are entering into unholy alliances to take land
from powerless property owners to transfer it to private developers.
Ironically, the political and legislative backlash against Kelo
demonstrates that Justice O'Connor's dissent was, at least to some
extent, misguided. Private property is not an endangered species in
the United States. Ordinary property owners appear to be more
influential than Justice O'Connor believed they could be. Indeed, any
local politician who now ignores the interests of ordinary property
owners when designing urban development and redevelopment plans
is likely to be surprised at the next election.
Regardless of the Court's holding, Kelo is not good news for city
officials and local developers because the political backlash that
followed the decision has made municipal development and
redevelopment substantially more difficult to accomplish, even where
it might be warranted. As we saw in Part II, several states have
310. See Sandefur, supra note 14, at 36 (referring to "legislative majorities" exercising power to
redistribute resources from legislative minorities to themselves); id. at 39 (referring to the threat to
eminent domain reform by discrete interest groups that engage in government capture).
311. See Yardley, supra note 225.
312. Nor is it clear that the plaintiffs in Kelo represent the majority interest in New London.
According to published reports, other residents are complaining about the plaintiffs' holding up a
socially desirable redevelopment project and raising questions about their motives. See, e.g., id.
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enacted, or are in the process of enacting, new laws that will make it
more difficult and, therefore, more costly for such projects to
proceed. In at least some cases, these new legal requirements are
likely to constitute more of a burden than any rule the dissenters in
Kelo (other than Justice Thomas) ever would have applied. And
Kelo's practical political impacts will likely be even more significant
than any new legislative restrictions. Increasingly, negative publicity
and political controversy are forcing governments and other players
in municipal development and redevelopment to reconsider largescale projects which require the use of eminent domain. At least for
the near term, the number of such projects will likely dwindle, not in
spite of, but because of the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo.

